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“SONUS QUI NON EST VOX:”  
SOUND AND VOICE IN THE BODY POLITIC  
 




From the knocking on the gate after Macbeth’s murder of Duncan to the 
sound of Ugolino’s teeth on the skull of his enemy, the suicide’s violent ex-
cretion of words and blood, Calvino’s “king who listens,” the Sicilian bull and 
the heavenly talking eagle, this essay considers the difference between the 
sound made by a voice and sounds that are merely instrumental or artificial as 
a feature of the body politic indicative of tyranny or justice. 
 




In her essay, “‘When Every Noise Appalls Me:’ Sound and Fear in 
Macbeth and Akira Kurosawa’s Throne of Blood,” Evelyn Tribble 
points to a “complex acoustic pattern,” a soundscape, in Shake-
speare’s plays, in which “off-stage sounds were particularly likely to 
be noted in promptbooks and in stage directions.” In Macbeth 
these include things like “thunder and lightning,” “a Bell rings,” “a 
flourish,” “an alarum.” Tribble remarks that because of an 1823 es-
say by Thomas De Quincey the sound of MacDuff’s knocking on 
the gate after Macbeth and his wife have done their fell deed “is 
probably the best known of any in Shakespeare.”1 
 
Whence is that knocking? 
How is’t with me, when every noise appals me? 
… 
I hear a knocking 
…  




1 Evelyn Tribble, “‘When Every Noise Appalls Me:’ Sound and Fear in Macbeth and 
Akira Kurosawa’s Throne of Blood” Shakespeare 1 (2005): 75-90. Tribble (81) also 
quotes film theorist Michel Chion who observes how sound penetrates the body: “we 
have no ear-lids to close it off: ‘[…] there is always something about sound that over-
whelms and surprises us no matter what.’” Michel Chion, Audio-Vision: Sound on 
Screen, trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 33.  
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knock! Who’s there, i’ th’other devil’s 
name?2  (Mac. II. 2-3) 
 
In that brief essay, De Quincey observed that, “Murder, in ordinary 
cases, where the sympathy is wholly directed to the case of the 
murdered person, is an incident of coarse and vulgar horror,” but a 
poet “must throw the interest on the murderer” on the raging 
“storm of passion, jealousy, ambition, vengeance, hatred which will 
create a hell within him; and into this hell we are to look.” 
 
Hence it is that, when the deed is done, when the work of darkness is 
perfect, then the world of darkness passes away like a pageantry in the 
clouds: the knocking at the gate is heard; and it makes known audibly 
that the reaction has commenced: the human has made its reflux upon 
the fiendish; the pulses of life are beginning to beat again; and the re-
establishment of the goings-on of the world in which we live, first 
makes us profoundly sensible of the awful parenthesis that had sus-
pended them.3 
 
At the end of Macbeth, it is the off-stage “cry of women” that 
announces the death of Lady Macbeth, to which the protagonist 
now fails to react (Tribble [82] calls it a “lack of somatic response”).  
And despite the fact that this event spurs his famous speech about 
life as mere “sound and fury, signifying nothing,” the sounds of the 
scene are all significant, prompting him to ask what they mean. 
 
A cry of within, of women 
 
MACBETH 
What is that noise? 
 
SEYTON 
It is the cry of women, my good Lord. 
Exit   
 
MACBETH 
I have almost forgot the taste of fears; 
The time has been, my senses would have cool’d 
To hear a night-shriek; and my fell of hair 
Would at a dismal treatise rouse, and stir, 
 
2 The Arden Shakespeare, eds. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thomson and David Scott 
Kasten (Walton-on-Thames: Nelson & sons, 1988), 779-780. 
3 Thomas De Quincey, “On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth,” in De Quincey, 
The Collected Writings, ed. David Masson (London: A. & C. Black, 1897), 391. 
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As life were in’t; I have supp’d full with horrors: 
Direness, familiar to my slaughterous thoughts, 
Cannot once start me.   
Re-enter SEYTON 
Wherefore was that cry? 
 
SEYTON 
The Queen, my Lord, is dead.4 
 
Unlike the bell that is rung just before Duncan’s murder and the 
knocking at the door immediately afterwards, the cry of women is 
the sound of voices, even if inarticulate ones.  They herald bad 
news even before it is given precise shape through the tongue of a 
messenger.   
Another example of the hellish horror of sound, following 
upon a parenthesis in which the poet, in the words of De Quincey, 
“throws interest on the murderer” on the raging “storm of passion, 
jealousy, ambition, vengeance, hatred which will create a hell 
within him; and into this hell we are to look,” is the episode of 
Ugolino at the bottom of Dante’s Hell. The Count’s monologue 
ends not with the awfully ambiguous, but nonetheless articulate 
line—“then fasting did more than grief could do” (“Poscia, più che 
’l dolor, poté ’l digiuno” [Inferno 33.75])—but with the sound of 
his teeth hitting hard against the skull of his enemy.  
 
riprese ’l teschio misero co’ denti, 
che furo a l’osso, come d’un can, forti. (Inf. 33.77-78)5 
 
He took up again the wretched skull with his teeth, that were  
loud against the bone, like those of a dog. 
 
The parenthesis of heightened drama, as De Quincey would say, is 
closed; and the ineluctable reality of everyday life in Hell resumes. 
The whole episode of Ugolino pivots around speaking and 
silence, what it is possible or preferable to say and what is unspeak-
able.  It is the promise of spreading infamy for his enemy that pulls 
Ugolino off his bloody repast (“se le mie parole esser dien seme / 
che frutti infamia” [33.7-8]), stopping, fastidiously, to wipe his 
mouth on the hair of the half-eaten head before he speaks. The 
poet, for his part, has promised to keep his side of the bargain: “if 
that with which I speak does not dry up” (“se quella con ch’io parlo 
non si secca” [32.139]). What is that feminine thing—quella—
 
4 Macbeth V.5, 795. 
5 Citations of the Divine Comedy are from Dante Alighieri, Divina Commedia, ed. 
Nicola Fosca (Canterano: Aracne, 2018). [Translations mine] 
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“with which I speak”?  Is it his mouth (“bocca”), like that of Ugo-
lino, eternally employed now in eating, not speaking? Or is it 
something that survives his mouth, something we would call 
“voice,” that he can rely upon to speak even to us, continuing to 
spread the promised seed of Ruggieri’s infamy, if it has not in the 
meantime “dried up”?   
By “voice” we mean not just the articulate sound Dante 
could once make with his anatomical equipment, but the written 
trace of that voice, what Stephen Nichols called “the sign of the 
voice that survives the voice once it falls silent.”6 Even before our 
present, sonic age, where audible voices can be as enduring as writ-
ten ones, voice was not even then, thanks to the technology of 
writing, as mortal as its original, fragile sounding-equipment; it 
could survive the shift in medium, provided it always had a new 
performer to animate a set of verbal signs.  The reason we still call 
a dead author’s voice a voice is because it is associated with, it be-
longed to, a particular historical body.  It was not the sound of an 
instrument used by a living being, but of that living being itself.  
When Ugolino turns back to eating, we no longer hear his voice: 
rather he makes significant sound by means of the bone of his vic-
tim.  Here the body of another becomes his sounding instrument.7   
What is the difference between voice and sound?  Both have 
to do with bodies, and even violence, since, as a thirteenth-century 
commentator on Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul explains: 
 
For the generation of sound [three things] are required: something hit, 
something doing the hitting, and a medium. The body that initiates 
the vibration is as much an active cause of the sound as the body that 
vibrates, because the first is the active cause of sound in so far as it 
breaks the air, yet the vibrating body holds the air and does not let it 
get out easily. Air is the subject of that breaking and that breaking is 
sound. 8  
 
6 Stephen Nichols, “Augustine and the Troubadour Lyric” in Vox Intexta: Orality 
and Textuality in the Middle Ages, eds. C. B. Pasternack and A. N. Doane (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin, 1991), 137-161, 152. 
7 This is also the case with Master Adam, the counterfeiter, whose belly, deformed by 
circulatory disease into the shape of a musical instrument (“fatto a guisa di lëuto”), is 
played not as a stringed instrument, but like a drum, when Sinon the Greek punches 
him in the belly (“Quella sonò come fosse un tamburo”) Inf. 30.49, 103 . 
8 Simon de Faversham (c.1260–1306), Quaestiones CXIV in Aristotelis libros de an-
ima [Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 10 135, fols. 87r–
118r, second half fourteenth century], in Vox atque Sonus. Studien zur Rezeption 
der Aristotelischen Schrift “De anima” und ihre Bedeutung für die Musiktheorie, ed. 
Michael Wittmann, 2 vols. (Pfaffenweiler, 1987), 2, 38: “In generatione soni re-
quiruntur percussus et percutiens et medium. Et tam verberantis quam verberatus est 
causa activa soni, quia corpus verberans est causa activa soni in quantum frangit aerem, 
4
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Sound is precipitated by violence, produced out of what Algazel 
called a vehement percussion or separation. 9 Although the act of 
eliciting the sonorous potential out of matter is natural, the condi-
tions of sound-making essentially require violence.10 Indeed for the 
commentators on the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, sound is a 
suffering (passio) of the air, caused by the collision of solid bodies.11 
Voice (vox) is a special kind of sound, Aristotle specified, emitted 
by an animate being accompanied by some sort of image, intent, or 
desire to signify something either naturally or conventionally.12 The 
soul is the principal agent of the voice, using air as its instrument. 
The soul is the percutiens (the striker), the vocal chords are what is 
 
corpus autem verberatum retinet aerem et non permittit ipsum faciliter ire. Aer ergo 
est subjectum illius fractionis et cetera talis fractio fit sonus.”  
9 Algazel, Physica 4, De anima vegetabili et animali et humana 3.3, in Algazel on the 
Soul, ed. Eva St. Clair, Traditio 60 (2005): 47-84, 64: “Sonus vero est quiddam quod 
fit in aere propter undationem accidentem aeri ex motu fortissimo proveniente ex 
vehementi aliquorum inter se percussione vel separatione. Tunc autem contingit ex 
percussione cum concurrunt sibi fortiter duo corpora, et aer qui erat inter ea exclu-
ditur violenter; tunc vero contingit ex separatione, cum movetur aer violenter inter 
duo corpora quae separantur, et fit sonus cum commotus aer pervenit usque quo 
pervenit motus commotionis.” See also Albertus Magnus, “Quid sit sonus?”Summa 
de creaturis 2.24.1, in Albertus Magnus, Opera omnia, ed. August Borgnet, 38 vols. 
(Paris, 1896), 35, 233.  
10 Albertus Magnus, “Utrum generatio soni sit naturalis vel violenta?” Summa de 
creaturis 2.24.3, 35, 236: “Illa est falsa, quod omnes conditiones circumstantes gener-
ationem soni, sunt violentae. Sunt enim conditiones soni ex parte materiae: actus 
enim sonativus educitur de potentia materiali, et proportio illius ad ipsam non est 
violenta, sed naturalis. Sed verum est, quod conditiones agentis violentae sunt.” 
11 Pietro d’Abano, Expositio Problematum 11.1, quoted in Charles Burnett, “Sound 
and its Perception in the Middle Ages,” in Second Sense: Studies in Hearing and 
Musical Judgement from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, eds. Charles Burnett, 
Michael Fend and Penelope Gouk (London, 1991), 43-70, 66 : “Est autem sonus 
passio vel accidens ex motione aeris causata collisione corporum solidorum auditu 
proprie percepta.”  
12 Aristotle, De anima, 402b5-6 and 420b31-2, Translatio antiqua in Thomas Aquinas, 
Commentary on De anima 2.18, in Doctoris angelici divi Thomae Aquinatis Opera 
omnia, eds. Stanislas Fretté and Paul Maré, 33 vols. (Paris, 1875), 24, 111: “Vox autem 
sonus quedam animati […]. Non enim omnis sonus animalis, vox est, sicuti diximus. 
Est enim et lingua sonare, et sicut tussientes. Sed oportet, et animatum verberans et 
cum imaginatione aliqua. Significativus eni quidam sonus est vox, et non respirati 
aeris, sicut tussis.” An anonymous commentator adds that the image accompanying 
the sound should come with the desire to signify either naturally or conventionally: 
Anonymous, Quaestiones super Aristotelis libros De anima I-III [Vatican City, Bib-
lioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 3016, fols. 65r–162v, fourteenth century], 
in Vox atque sonus, 2, 90: “Ad hoc enim quod sonus dicatur vox seu dicatur fieri ab 
anima inquantum huius requiritur, quod sit cum ymagine et appetitu intendente ad 
aliquid significandum, quia omnis vox est significans naturaliter vel ad placitum.” 
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struck (percussum), and breathed air is the medium of the sound.13 
Pietro d’Abano, commentator on the pseudo-Aristotelian Prob-
lemata explains that “voice is caused by the striking of the air 
breathed from the soul through the windpipe with the intention of 
signifying something.”14 Animals also have voice, through which 
they express happiness or sadness, comfort or discomfort, as does a 
barking dog.15 What is necessary to voice is soul, even an animal 
soul.  Although all living things have souls, not all of them have 
voice. Fish, for example, can make noise with their fins, but be-
cause they lack breath, Aristotle says, they are making sound but 
have no voice.  There is a distinction then, not just between bodily 
voice and written traces, but between sounds made by means of 
instruments and voice that requires the breath of an animate being, 
not necessarily human. 
  In her 2014 review of scholarship since the 1990s address-
ing the status of the voice within, anthropologist Amanda 
Weidman gestures toward its “host of associations between voice 
and individuality, authorship, agency, authority, and power” and 
isolates “the idea of voice as guarantor of truth and self-presence, 
from which springs the familiar idea that the voice expresses self 
and identity and that agency consists in having a voice.”16 All of 
these associations—the guarantee of truth and self-presence and the 
expression of self, identity, agency, authority and power—are dis-
cernible in the places where Dante highlights sound and voice. 
There is a further distinction worth making, and which I believe 
Dante makes, between a voice produced by the soul of a particular 
 
13 Anonymus, Quaestiones, [Vat. lat. 3016], Vox atque sonus, cit., 2, 90-91: “Et dictis 
patet, quod in formatione vocis anima est principalis agens et utitur aere ut instru-
mento ad formandum vocem. […] Anima igitur in formatione vocis est percutiens et 
arteria percussum et aer respiratus est medium.” 
14 Charles Burnett, “Hearing and Music in Book XI of Pietro d’Abano’s Expositio 
Problematum Aristotelis” in Tradition and Ecstasy: The Agony of the Fourteenth 
Century, ed. Nancy van Deusen (Ottawa, 1997), 153-190, 156.  
15 Blasius Pelacanus de Parma, Vox atque Sonus, 2, 116: “brutis animalibus inest vox, 
per quam solummodo explicant laetitiam aut tristitiam, seu conveniens seu discon-
veniens, sicut latrans canis.” The harpies who live in the wood of the suicides are 
ambiguous part animal, part human beings; they too have voice, perched in the trees 
like birds, they make their “laments”: “fanno lamenti in su li alberi strani” (Inf. 13.15). 
16 Amanda Weidman, “Anthropology and Voice,” Annual Review of Anthropology 
43 (2014): 37-51, 39: “The Western metaphysical and linguistic traditions have be-
queathed us two powerful ideas about voice. One is the idea of voice as guarantor of 
truth and self-presence, from which springs the familiar idea that the voice expresses 
self and identity and that agency consists in having a voice. This is coupled with a 
second idea: that the sonic and material aspects of the voice are separable from and 
subordinate to its referential content or message, an assumption that underlies much 
of modern linguistic ideology.”  
6
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body with that body, and an instrumental sound—a sound that is 
not voice. This sound that is not voice can be, as we shall see, the 
opposite of voice, a hollow sound, and a reduction of the human 
to mere instrument, but Dante also proposes it as a metaphor for 
the political community. Contrary to the suspicion that the sonic 
and material qualities of voice have been erased by or subsumed 
into an abstract and silent logos, as we find in Adriana Cavarero and 
her followers, we find, in Dante, at least, a persistent concern for 
the mechanics of sound production, natural and artificial, even in 
the representation of the body politic in the abstract.   
Voice is a subset of sound. Not all sound is voice. This an-
cient philosophical distinction can be found even in a fourteenth-
century musical treatise, contemporary with Dante, where we learn 
that harmonic music is the sound that is made by the sound that is 
voice, which is to say through the voices of men and animals. The 
sound that is voice is the sound of air reverberating with breath. It 
is audible to the sense of hearing, and it is only formed in “natural 
animal instruments,” which Marchetto of Padua names as lung, 
throat, palate, tongue, front teeth, and lips, although some animals, 
like birds, can make sound without teeth. The indispensable instru-
ments for the production of voice are lungs, throat, palate, and 
lips.17 By contrast, the sound emitted by instruments, by stringed 
instruments, percussive instruments, and even by expressive musical 
instruments filled with human breath, is not voice.   
 
Sound that is not voice can be formed without natural instruments, 
with the breath or the impulse of air set in vibration alone, as is manifest 
in all artificial instruments in which sound is produced with some sort 
of breath – as in the trumpet and the organ. 18  
 
What we would call “instrumental” music Marchetto calls “or-
ganic,” which is made by means of the sound that is not voice, even 
if it is produced by human breath, as in trumpets, pipes, organs, and 
 
17 The Lucidarium of Marchetto of Padua: A Critical Edition, Translation, and Com-
mentary, trans. and ed. Jan W. Herlinger (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), 68–106, ch. 9, 90-91: “DE SONO QUI EST VOX sonus aeris 
spiritu verberati, sensibilis auditu, solum in naturalibus instrumentis animalis formatus: 
Instrumenta enim naturalia vocis dicimus quod ad plus sunt sex, scilicet pulmo, guttur, 
palatum, lingua, dentes anteriores, et labia, licet sine quibusdam ex istis quedam ani-
malia possint formare vocem, scilicet aves, que non habent dentes, sed necessaria in-
strumenta omnino ad formandam vocem sunt pulmo, guttur, palatum, et labia; sine 
istis enim sonus qui est vox nullatenus esse potest.” 
18 Lucidarium, ch. 13, 98-99: “Sonus qui non est vox formari potest etiam sine natu-
ralibus instrumentis, solum enim cum anhelitu et impulsu aeris verberati, sicut patet 
in omnibus instrumentis artificialibus in quibusdam enim fit talis sonus cum quodam 
anhelitu, sicut in tuba et organo.”   
7
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the like.19 What we would call “vocal” he calls “harmonic,” pro-
duced by the sound that is voice—that is, by the voices of human 
beings or animals.”20 The sound that is voice is more perfect than 
the sound that is not voice. 21 
In a much older and highly influential treatise on music, the 
sixth-century Roman senator Boethius wrote there were three 
kinds of music:  mundana, humana, and organica or instrumentalis.  
Only the last of these is audible, because what Boethius seems to 
mean by musica humana is not vocal music as opposed to instru-
mental, but rather an inner harmony, an affective union between 
body and soul, in turn modelled on the music of the universe, the 
musica mundana, an a priori structure, or order, that underlies all 
being, which according to tradition was the harmony produced by 
the turning of the crystalline spheres that carried the planets and the 
stars. Audible music appeals to our senses precisely because of its 
resemblance to our inner musica humana, which Hugh of St. Vic-
tor in his Didascalicon describes as a “natural friendship by which 
the soul is bound to the body by incorporeal bond.”22 
This is the bond of natural friendship that is broken—be-
trayed, actually—in the act of suicide, and Dante dramatizes this in 
the thirteenth canto of the Inferno in the way the suicides speak.  
They have become trees who speak only when broken, with words 
and blood exiting the wound, like pent-up vapor escaping a burn-
ing log.  
 
Come d’un stizzo verde ch’arso sia  
da l’un de’capi, che da l’altro geme  
e cigola per vento che va via, 
sì de la scheggia rotta usciva insieme  
parole e sangue (Inf. 13.40-45) 
 
 
19 Lucidarium, ch. 12, 96-97: “Musica organica est, que fit per sonum qui non est 
vox, et tamen cum anhelitu hominis seu aeris fit, ut in tubis, cimellis, fistulis, organis, 
et hiis similibus.” 
20 Lucidarium, ch. 8, 88-89: “Musica armonica est illa que fit per sonum qui est vox, 
hoc est per voces hominum et animalium.” 
21 Lucidarium, ch. 13, 98-99: “Sonus qui est vox plus continet de perfectione quam 
sonus qui non est vox.” 
22 Boethius, De institutione musica I.ii. Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon II.12, trans. 
Jerome Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). See Francesco Cia-
battoni, Dante’s Journey to Polyphony, 47-48, 92; Chiara Cappuccio, “Quando a 
cantar con organi si stea’ (Purg. IX, 144). Riflessi danteschi della polemica contro la 
polifonia?” Tenzone 8 (2007): 31-64. On musica humana, see also Hyun-Ah Kim’s 
recent The Renaissance Ethics of Music: Singing, Contemplation and Musica Hu-
mana (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2015).  
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As from a green branch set on fire from one end, that groans from the 
other and creaks with the wind that is departing, in the same way from 
the broken splinter issued both words and blood. 
 
In the uncured log thrown on the fire, the sound it produces is 
described as a meteorological event. Dry heat encountering moist 
cold produces a wind that then needs to escape from its confine-
ment. It is, like all weather, a matter of flatulence. From the simile 
of the hissing log, Leo Spitzer concluded that “the language of the 
plant-men is mere flatus vocis, wind-begotten speech,” that the 
genesis of this speech is a “purely material process” and, most mem-
orably, that speech has become simply a matter of “bodily dis-
charges”—an involuntary effluence of words out of the body, like 
blood.23 It escapes from the body, providing relief, just as the sui-
cide sought release by hoping to escape his own body, which had 
become a prison to his soul.   
 The suicide thus has a Platonic view of the soul: that it is 
simply “housed” or “clothed” or “imprisoned” by the body, from 
which it longs to be free – a view readily accessible even in the 
Aeneid where Anchises explains how souls in Hades are imprisoned 
in the dark prison of the body: 
 
….neque auras  
dispiciunt clausae tenebris et carcere caeco 
 
Imprisoned in the darkness of the body   
They cannot see clearly heaven’s air24 
 
Pier delle Vigne was actually in a dark prison, accused of treason 
against the Emperor, where he was blinded and eventually killed 
himself by beating his head against the wall. Suicide appeared to be 
a way out. As he puts it, in one of the many convoluted phrases in 
his speech,  
 
L’animo mio, per disdegnoso gusto,  
 
23 Leo Spitzer, “Speech and Language in Inferno XIII,” Italica 19 (1942): 81-104, 89: 
“The fact that Dante chose to describe a hissing, guttering fire-log by way of charac-
terizing the genesis of speech in his uomini-piante shows that he conceived this as 
representing a purely physical process: the issue of blood and cries is on the same low 
‘material’ level as is the issue of sap and hissing sound from a fire-log. Indeed, the fact 
that we have to do with speech of a non-human order, with speech that is a matter 
of bodily discharges, was already suggested by the terrible line usciva inseme parole e 
sangue.” See also Alison Cornish, “Words and Blood: Suicide and the Sound of the 
Soul (Inferno 13),” Speculum 91, no. 4 (2016): 1015-1026. 
24 Aeneid 6.733-734. The Aeneid of Virgil, Books 1-6, ed. R. D. Williams (London: 
MacMillan, 1972), 148. Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. Robert Fitzgerald (New York: 
Vintage, 1981), 185. 
9
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credendo col morir fuggir disdegno, 
ingiusto fece me contra me giusto. (Inf. 13.70-72) 
 
My mind, with disdainful gusto, believing to flee disdain by dying, 
made myself unjust against my just self. 
 
These lines are remarkable for their splitting of the single self of 
Pier (me contra me) into guilty perpetrator and innocent victim 
and for the obvious impossibility of a disdainful soul to flee disdain 
by fleeing its body, since disdain and its effects reside in the soul 
itself.   
For Aristotle, unlike for Plato, the soul is not a mere inmate 
or even the driver of the body, but its substantial form, which 
means it is completely and wholly in all of it. The soul is not simply 
housed, clothed, imprisoned or trapped by the body. As Thomas 
Aquinas explains in the Summa Theologica, some philosophers 
 
said that the entire nature of man is seated in the soul, so that the soul 
makes use of the body as an instrument, or as a sailor uses his ship: 
wherefore according to this opinion, it follows that if happiness is at-
tained by the soul alone, man would not be balked in his natural desire 
for happiness, and so there is no need to hold the resurrection. But the 
Philosopher sufficiently destroys this foundation (De anima ii, 2), 
where he shows that the soul is united to the body as form to matter.25 
 
Which means, as Thomas explains elsewhere, it is the soul that 
gives the material body its existence, “for the form is that through 
which a thing is the very thing that it is.”26 The relation of soul to 
body is precisely not that of a trumpet player to his trumpet, or a 
sailor to his ship, even if it is the soul that “makes the percussion” 
on the vocal chords in the formation of sound by means of inhaled 
air, because the soul is the substantial form of the body. 27 The body 
 
25 The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2nd ed, 1920. Literally translated 
by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Online Edition Copyright © 2017 by 
Kevin Knight. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici, Summa Theologica, Sup-
plementum, Quaestio 75, Art. 1, Respondeo, Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis 
XIII P.M. edita, vol 12, Tertia Pars Summae Theologiae (Rome: 1906), 170: 
“Quidam vero posuerunt totam hominis naturam in anima constare, ita ut anima 
corpore uteretur sicut instrumento, aut sicut nauta navi. Unde secundum hanc opi-
nionem sequitur quod, sola anima beatificata, homo naturali desiderio beatitudinis 
non frustraretur. Et sic non oportet ponere resurrectionem. —Sed hoc fundamentum 
sufficienter Philosophus, in II de Anima, destruit, ostendens animam corpori sicut 
formam materiae uniri.”  
26  Thomas Aquinas, Questions on the Soul, trans. James H. Robb (Milwaukee: Mar-
quette University Press, 1984), 9. 
27 Anon., Quaestiones super Aristotelis libros De anima I-III. Vat lat 3016. 14th c. fols. 
65r-162v, fol. 109v; Vox atque Sonus, 91: “Anima igitur in formatione vocis est 
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is what it is because of its soul, and is therefore a sign of it, not a 
container for it. Voice is not simply a sound the body makes or can 
be made to make. It is the sensible sign of the soul, the soul that is 
that body.  
 This broken relationship between body and soul is drama-
tized in Pier’s production of speech. Words exit his split bark like 
sound escaping from a green log on the fire, like blood spurting 
from a wound.  To sustain the dialogue he must however “blow 
hard” through his trunk to get more words to come out, for that 
wind to be changed into voice.  
 
Allor soffiò il tronco forte, e poi 
si convertì quel vento in cotal voce (Inf. 13.91-92) 
 
So the trunk blew hard, and then the wind was converted into such a 
voice 
 
The soul in fact uses air, not the body, but air, as its instrument to 
produce voice. But inanimate things, even those inflated with hu-
man breath, can only have the semblance of voice.   
 
if anything inanimate is said to have a voice, it is by analogy, the way 
a flute or a lyre or other instruments are said, by analogy, to have 
voice.28   
 
What Pier has now for a body is a hollow wooden casing into 
which he can force air to produce sound, a kind of musical instru-
ment—a woodwind. The suicide, in his tree, like the suicidal, feels 
“trapped” or imprisoned inside a body that is a mere instrument, 
rather than the sign, the expression, the signature of his soul. 
The suicide’s desire for escape from the body, like air leaving 
a balloon, is, like all infernal desires, both granted and intensified 
by the eternal punishment. The suicides in Dante’s Hell are the 
only ones who will not get their bodies back. Or rather, the suicide 
 
percutiens et arteria percussum et aer respiratus est medium Deinde dicitur quae est 
in his partibus, quia licet anima sit tota in tota in toto, ut est forma substantialis, tamen 
secundum quod motiva principaliter est in corde sive secundum quod motum cor-
poris.” [Therefore in the formation of voice the soul is the one that makes the per-
cussion and the chords are the thing struck and breathed air is the medium. Finally it 
is said that [the soul] is in these parts, because even though the soul is completely in 
all parts in the whole, as it is the substantial form, nonetheless insofar as it is the mover 
or movement of the body, it is principally in the heart.] 
28 Anon., Quaestiones super Aristotelis libros De anima I-III. Vat lat 3016. 14th c. fols 
65r-162v, (fol. 109v); Vox atque Sonus cit., 88: “vox est sonus animati corporis[…]si 
aliquod inanimatum dicatur habere vocem hoc est secundum similitudinem, tamen 
sicut tibia et lir et alia instrumenta similitudine dicuntur habere vocem.” 
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will get his body back, but he will not be able to “put it on.” In 
other words, he will not be able to be incarnated by it: it will just 
drape over his branches like a lifeless body hanging from a tree, or 
as W. B. Yeats would say, “a tattered coat upon a stick.”29 
 
Come l’altre verrem per nostre spoglie, 
ma non però ch’alcuna sen rivesta,  
ché non è giusto aver ciò ch’om si toglie.  
Qui le trascineremo, e per la mesta  
selva saranno i nostri corpi appesi,  
ciascuno al prun de l’ombra sua molesta. (Inf. 13.103-108) 
 
Like the others we will come for what we shed [the bodies we took 
off], but not so that any of us should be reclothed with them, because 
it is not just to have that which one takes from himself. Here we will 
drag them, and throughout the sad wood will our bodies be hung, each 
one from the thorn of its own wounded shade. 
  
In treating his body as something that can be shed, the suicide re-
jects the essential identity of soul and body, which is what he in 
fact aims violently to break. The rupture between signifier (body) 
and signified (soul) is clearly cognate with the rupture between 
speech and belief central to this canto, a rupture that causes the 
character of Dante unwittingly to commit his own violence by rais-
ing his hand against the wounded soul. 
 
Cred’ ïo ch’ei credette ch’io credesse 
che tante voci uscisser, tra quei bronchi, 
da gente che per noi si nascondesse. 
Però disse ’l maestro: ‘Se tu tronchi 
qualche fraschetta d’una d’este piante, 
li pensier c’hai si faran tutti monchi.’ 
Allor porsi la mano un poco avante 
e colsi un ramicel da un gran pruno; 
e ’l tronco suo gridò: ‘Perché mi schiante?’ (Inf. 13.25-33) 
 
I believe that he believed that I believed that so many voices were 
coming out from among those trunks from people hidden from us. For 
that reason the master said, “If you break a twig from one of these 
plants, your thoughts you have will be all cut off. So I stretched out 
my hand a little and picked a little branch from a great thornbush, and 
its trunk cried out, “Why do you tear me apart?”  
 
 
29  W. B. Yeats, “Sailing to Byzantium,” 9-12: “An aged man is but a paltry thing, / 
A tattered coat upon a stick, unless Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing / For 
every tatter in its mortal dress.” 
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The character Virgil, rather incredibly, apologizes to the broken 
tree-soul on Dante’s behalf, blaming his failure to believe not in 
the authority Virgil’s words spoken just a moment ago, but in the 
third book of his epic poem where he recounts a similar scene of 
broken branches eliciting screams of pain (Aeneid III.13-65): 
 
‘S’elli avesse potuto creder prima,’ 
rispuose ‘l savio mio, ‘anima lesa, 
ciò c’ha veduto pur con la mia rima, 
non averebbe in te la man distesa; 
ma la cosa incredibile mi fece 
indurlo ad ovra ch’a me stesso pesa’ (Inf. 13.46-51) 
 
If he had been able to believe before, replied my sage, ‘O wounded 
soul, what he had only seen with my rhyme, he would not have lifted 
his hand against you; but the incredible thing made me induce him to 
do something that weighs on me as well.’ 
 
When Pier swears by the new roots of his tree that he never 
broke faith with his lord, who was so worthy, he is essentially in-
dicting the emperor Frederick II for having broken faith with 
him.30  
 
Per le nove radici d’esto legno 
vi giuro che già mai non ruppi fede  
al mio segnor, che fu d’onor sì degno (Inf. 13.73-75)  
 
By the new roots of this tree, I swear that I never broke faith with my 
lord, who was so worthy of honor. 
 
And whether or not Pier is innocent of breaking faith with that 
lord— from whom, like St. Peter from Christ, he received the keys 
to lock and unlock his heart—he is certainly guilty of breaking faith 
with another, worthier Lord, who never breaks faith, that is, 
Christ.31  
 
Io son colui che tenni ambo le chiavi 
del cor di Federigo e che le volsi  
serrando e diserrando, sì soavi […] (Inf. 13.58-60) 
 
I am he who held both the keys to the heart of Frederick, and who 
turned them so smoothly, locking and unlocking […] 
 
30 Inf. 13.73-75: “Per le nove radici d’esto legno / vi giuro che già mai non ruppi 
fede / al mio segnor, che fu d’onor sì degno.” For the historical Pier’s idolatrous 
eulogy of Frederick II, equating him with Christ, see Stephany, “Pier della Vigna’s 
Self-fulfilling Prophecies.” 
31 Inf. 13.58-59: “Io son colui che tenni ambo le chiavi/del cor di Federigo.” 
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In fact his lifeless body, after the resurrection will eventually hang 
from the tree, an unmistakable iconographic echo of the fate of 
Judas.32 At the root of the suicide’s despair is a deafness to the In-
carnation, the Divine Word become flesh, which Augustine com-
pares to our own acts of speech:   
 
Just as when we speak, in order that what we have in our minds may 
enter through the ear into the mind of the hearer, the word which we 
have in our hearts becomes an outward sound and is called speech; and 
yet our thought does not lose itself in the sound, but remains complete 
in itself, and takes the form of speech without being modified in its 
own nature by the change: so the Divine Word, though suffering no 
change of nature, yet became flesh, that He might dwell among us. 33 
 
Because voice, the authentic voice, is a sign of soul, speech is es-
sentially the incarnation of the divine in the human.   
In her 2003 book, A più voci, translated as For More than 
One Voice by Paul Kottman in 2005, Italian feminist philosopher 
Adriana Cavarero makes a political claim about the embodied na-
ture of voice, that it presents a unique individual needing to be 
rescued from formalized, universal, abstract, and also written sys-
tems such as the law, governmental arrangements, tradition that 
might metaphysically efface that voice. Her book begins with a re-
telling, in her own voice, of a story by Italo Calvino, “The King 
Listens”  [Un re in ascolto]: 
 
In the palace, which, like ‘a great ear,’ has ‘pavilions, ducts, shells, lab-
yrinths,’ every sound is a sign of either fidelity or betrayal.  There are 
many hidden spies to interpret: whispers, rumors, vibrations, crashes, 
oceans of silence.  Naturally, there are also human voices in the palace.  
But ‘every voice that knows it is heard by the King acquires a cold 
glaze’; it becomes a courtly voice, artificial, false – not so much for 
what it says, but in its very sonorous materiality. […] The courtiers’ 
throats ‘are no longer able to emit the true and unmistakable voice of 
life—namely, the voice that ‘involves the throat, saliva, infancy, the 
 
32 On the iconographic resemblance of the suicides to Judas, see Robert Hol-
lander, “Pier delle Vigne and Judas Iscariot: a note on “Inferno” XIII,” Electronic 
Bulletin of the Dante Society of America (2014) [http://www.prince-
ton.edu/~dante/ebdsa/]; Anthony K. Cassell, Dante’s Fearful Art of Justice (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1984), 46-56. On the significance of voice in the canto 
of the suicides, see Anne C. Leone, “‘Tante voci […] tra quei bronchi’: Authorical 
Agency and Textual Borrowing in Inferno XIII,” Le tre corone 2 (2015): 111-130. 
33 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana 1.13.26, trans. and ed. R. P. H. Green (Oxford, 
1995), 22-25. 
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patina of experienced life, the mind’s intentions, the pleasure of giving 
a personal form to sound waves.’34  
 
Calvino’s king’s palace resembles nothing so much as the 
court of Frederick II, where envy inflamed the courtiers against 
Pier delle Vigne to put an accusation of treachery in the ear of the 
emperor. The monarch, who is unable to trust, listens for treachery, 
and hears only inauthentic sound, not real voice which, as Calvino 
puts it, signifies a living person with “throat, chest, feelings, who 
sends into the air this voice, different from all other voices.”35 The 
essential point of Calvino’s poetic observation, for Cavarero, is that 
the individual voice is singular. It is therefore never fully repre-
sented, if not indeed completely erased, by the silent “logos of the 
law.” As Elisabetta Bertolino puts it in her recent study:   
 
For Cavarero, the voice communicates the uniqueness and corporeal-
ity of each one of us and resonates in the flesh of one’s throat. In one’s 
voice there is the experience of a singular being in relationality. In 
contrast, the voice of law is the voice of the general, silent and visible 
Logos that organizes the disembodied substance of the signified of 
law.36 
  
Nothing could resemble more Cavarero’s and Bertolino’s 
notion of a formalized, universal, abstract, and also written voice of 
law, government, authority and just plain meaning (that Cavarero 
puts in opposition to “sonorous materiality” or “phonic substance”) 
than the gigantic, talking eagle, symbol of Empire, that Dante 
 
34 Adriana Cavarero, For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Ex-
pression, trans. P. Kottman (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). Original text 
in A più voci: Filosofia dell’espressione vocale (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2003), 7-8: “Nel 
palazzo che, come un grande orecchio, ha ‘padiglioni, trombe, timpani, chiocciole, 
labirinti,’ ogni suono è un indizio di fedeltà o congiura. Molte e incerte sono le spie 
da interpretare: sussurri, rumori, vibrazioni, tonfi, laghi di silenzio. Ci sono natural-
mente anche voci umane el palazzo. Ma ‘ogni voce che sa d’essere ascoltata dal re 
acquista uno smalto freddo, una vitrea compiacenza’. Insomma, diventa una voce 
cortigiana, artefatta, falsa: non tanto per quello che dice, ma proprio nella sua mate-
rialità sonora. […] non sono più capaci di emettere la voce vera e inconfondibile della 
vita, ossia la voce che ‘mette in gioco l’ugola, la saliva, l’infanzia, la patina della vita 
vissuta, le intenzioni della mente, il piacere di dare una propria forma alle onde so-
nore.’” 
35 Calvino’s epigraph to Un re in ascolto: “Una voce significa questo: c’è una persona 
viva, gola, torace, sentimenti, che spinge nell’aria questa voce diversa da tutte le altre 
voci.” Cavarero, A più voci, 10. 
36 Elisabetta Bertolino, Adriana Cavarero: Resistance and the Voice of Law (London: 
Taylor and Francis, 2017), 14. For a thought-provoking critique of Cavarero, see 
Dominic Pettman, “Pavlov’s Podcast: The Acousmatic Voice in the Age of MP3s,” 
Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 22 (2011): 140-167. See also 
Shane Butler, The Ancient Phonograph (New York : Zone Books 2015). 
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installs in the heaven of Jupiter in his Paradiso. Readers of the poem 
will recall that the souls appearing in this heaven, representing jus-
tice, and in this planet, associated with tempering the extremes of 
hot Mars and cold Saturn, first spell out a written text, one letter at 
a time, while singing in unison. They form one letter after another, 
for a total of 35 vowels and consonants, not all at once, but over 
time, with one shape necessarily dissolving in order to build the 
next, as in a spectacular (think Times Square) or like a spell-out in 
a football stadium (“give me an M”). The message they spell out is: 
“Diligite iustitiam qui iudicatis terram” [Love justice, you who rule 
the earth], a quotation from the first verse of the Book of Wisdom 
pronounced in preachers’ sermons, included in motets, and in-
scribed in municipal paintings in central and northern city-states in 
this very period.37   
 
Mostrarsi dunque in cinque volte sette  
vocali e consonanti; e io notai  
le parti sì, come mi parver dette  
‘DILIGITE IUSTITIAM’, primai  
fur verbo e nome di tutto ‘l dipinto;  
‘QUI IUDICATIS TERRAM’, fur sezzai. (Par. 18.88-93) 
 
They showed themselves then in five time seven vowels and conso-
nants; and I noted the parts so that, as it seemed they were saying 
“LOVE JUSTICE,” first were the first verb and noun of all the paint-
ing; “WHO JUDGE THE EARTH” were the rest. 
 
Since the soul-lights composing the letters were just rulers, they 
literally mean what, together, they say, write and sing: they are the 
message. Just rulers are the medium and the message of just rule— 
which is what the eagle stands for. J. L. Austin has written famously 
about speech that performs an act; here it is the actions of many 
that, read together over time, throughout history, perform an ut-
terance.38  
 
37 Ovidio Capitani, “L’incompiuto ‘tractatus de iustitia’ di fra’ Remigio de’ Girolami 
(d.1319),” Bullettino dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio mura-
toriano 72 (1961): 91-134, 125. Rosa Maria Dessì “‘Diligite iustitiam vos qui iudicatis 
terram’ (Sagesse I, 1). Sermons et discours sur la justice dans l’Italie urbaine (XIIe-
Xve siècle),” Rivista internazionale di diritto comune 18 (2007): 197-230. Rachel 
Jacoff, “‘Diligite iustitiam’: Loving Justice in Siena and Dante’s Paradiso,” Modern 
Language Notes 124, no. 5 (2009): S81-S95. Eleonora Beck, “Justice and Music in 
Giotto’s Scrovegni Chapel Frescoes,” Music in Art 29 (2004): 38-51. Jacopo da Bo-
logna (fl. 1340 – c. 1386) wrote a motet “Lux purpurata/Diligite justiciam.” 
38 Denys Turner puts Austin’s idea of “performative” utterances alongside Wittgen-
stein’s “uttering performances” in “How to Do Things with Words: Poetry as Sacra-
ment in Dante’s Commedia,” in Dante’s Commedia. Theology as Poetry, eds. Vit-
torio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne (Notre Dame, 2010), 286-307.  
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In Dante’s light show, the focus on media is intensified when 
the temporal alphabetical sequence resolves into a graphic sign. The 
final “M” (last letter of the accusative “iustitiam”) then morphs 
from letter to picture, becoming first a lily and then an eagle. Since 
the lily is the symbol both of Florence and of the kings of France 
and the eagle is the symbol of the Roman empire, the dissolution 
of one into the other indicates the way a lesser, more geographically 
specific political entity yields to and is absorbed by an over-arching, 
universal one. In Dante’s ideal, this is the acknowledgement of a 
higher political order that circumscribes smaller ones. The eagle 
formed out of the “M” of the message itself begins to speak, and 
takes pains to say that its voice is of the entire conglomerate, not 
one speaking for the many.39 Yet when this composite bird falls 
silent, instantly (subitamente) the souls that constitute that shape 
begin to sing with their own various voices. The singular, individ-
ual voice is not therefore erased in the conglomerate.  The disinte-
gration of the unison voice of the talking eagle into the multiple 
voices of its constituent members is not rendered as cacophonous, 
but their songs are nonetheless marked as temporal and evanescent 
(labili e caduci), slipping from the poet’s memory  
 
come ’l segno del mondo e de’ suoi duci  
nel benedetto rostro fu tacente; 
però che tutte quelle vive luci,  
vie più lucendo, cominciaron canti  
da mia memoria labili e caduci. (Par. 20.8-12) 
 
When the sign of the world and of its leaders was silent in the blessed beak; 
because all those living lights, radiating ever more, began songs that slip 
and fall from my memory 
 
Dante’s eagle is not God, nor is it an or the Emperor, or any his-
torical or even possible earthly polity.  It is rather a sign, the “sign 
of the world and its leaders,” the symbol of the ideal form of world 
government, which Dante believed would be transnational, and 
universal, yet it is a symbol composed of actual historical individu-
als. These people are portrayed as luminous visual objects as well as 
sounding entities. They sing (hence they have voices) but they are 
also described as musical instruments, “flutes,” played with the 
breath of holy thoughts  
 
O dolce amor che di riso t’ammanti, 
quanto parevi ardente in que’ flailli, 
 
39 Par. 19.10-12: “ch’io vidi e anche udi’ parlar lo rostro, / e sonar ne la voce e ‘io’ e 
‘mio’, / quand’ era nel concetto e ‘noi’ e ‘nostro.’“  
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ch’avieno spirto sol di pensier santi! (Par. 20.13-15) 
 
O sweet love who mantles yourself in a smile, how you seemed ardent 
in those flutes40, who had the breath only of holy thoughts.  
  
In these lines, the individual voices seem to emerge from the voice 
of the eagle, yet the voice of the eagle is itself a conglomeration of 
all these separate voices, sounding in unison (as in the motto e plu-
ribus unum—out of many, one) as will be even clearer in the fol-
lowing image.   
 In the next lines the singers, described as precious stones or-
namenting the planet of Jupiter, impose silence on their “angelic 
chimes” (again suggesting artificial instruments rather than organic 
voices) and the eagle begins again to speak. The sound begins as a 
murmur, with the sound of a river falling on rocks, because in fact 
it is “splashing” off the “brilliant, precious stones” that “bejewel” 
this heaven.  This sound is natural, percussive, but also meaningful: 
because its power indicates the abundance of its source.41  
 
Poscia che i cari e lucidi lapilli  
ond’ io vidi ingemmato il sesto lume  
puoser silenzio a li angelici squilli, 
udir mi parve un mormorar di fiume  
che scende chiaro giù di pietra in pietra,  
mostrando l’ubertà del suo cacume (Par. 20.16-21) 
 
After the shining, precious stones with which I saw the sixth light be-
jeweled had imposed silence on the angelic chimes, it seemed I heard 
the murmuring of a river that falls clear from rock to rock, showing 
the abundance of its source. 
 
In the watery image, the river falls down, whereas the speech it 
describes is gurgling upward in the throat of the eagle, as we can 
see in these next lines. The sound starts deep down in the murmur 
of the many souls forming the body of the eagle and takes on the 
form of articulate speech only as it converges up in its hollow-
seeming neck.  From there, sound becomes voice, to form words 
issuing from the beak, words that Dante wrote first in his heart and 
then in the lines of terza rima that follow.  
 
 
40 Dante’s word for “flutes” (flailli) is a hapax, that is, a word not found elsewhere in 
records of the Italian language. It is thought to derive from Old French words for 
“flute (flavel) or “flame” (flael). The fourteenth-century commentator Benvenuto da 
Imola says it derives from Latin flatus, meaning “breath.” 
41 etymology of music from moys, water. 
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E come suono al collo de la cetra  
prende sua forma, e sì com’ al pertugio  
de la sampogna vento che penètra,  
così, rimosso d’aspettare indugio,  
quel mormorar de l’aguglia salissi  
su per lo collo, come fosse bugio.  
Fecesi voce quivi, e quindi uscissi  
per lo suo becco in forma di parole,  
quali aspettava il core ov’ io le scrissi. (Par. 20.22-30) 
 
And just as the sound of the stringed instrument takes form at its neck, 
and as the wind that penetrates the pipe does at its opening, in the same 
way, without any delay, that murmuring of the eagle rose up through 
the neck, as if it were hollow. There it became voice, and from there 
it issued out of the beak in the form of words, awaited by my heart 
where I wrote them down. 
 
This passage is markedly musical because of the specific instruments 
it names, the cetra and the sampogna, with attention to how each 
forms its particular sounds. The fourteenth-century commentator 
on Dante, Benvenuto da Imola, observes that sweet sound is gath-
ered in the cithara by the many chords that are formed on its neck, 
just as the sweet voice in the eagle is formed in its neck out of the 
many voices of the souls; or as the wind that has collected in an 
inflated skin then passes through a smaller opening of the pipe.42 
Sampogna, moreover, is a vernacularization of the word sympho-
nia. Both instruments, then, indicate a unification of the many in 
one.43  
 
42 Benvenuto da Imola (The Dartmouth Dante Project) ad locum : “sicut in cithara 
colligitur dulcis sonus ex multis chordis qui formatur in collo, ita dulcis vox in aquila 
colligebatur ex multis vocibus animarum et formabatur incollo. Et adducit aliam com-
parationem, dicens: e sì come vento che penetra, idest, pertransit per foramina collectus 
primo intra pellem inflatam, supple et repete, prendit suam formam, al pertugio della 
sampogna, idest, ad formam symphoniae in collo; et est etiam haec propria compara-
tio; quia sicut in symphonia exit dulcis sonus ex aere collecto intra pellem, et erumpit 
per foramen fistulae, ita a simili in aquila ex spiritu concepto inter ipsam exalabat vox 
dulcis per collum et emittebatur per os.” 
43 Early commentators gloss Dante’s stringed instrument, cetra, as cetera, chitarra, 
liuto, cithara, citra. Isidore of Seville (d. 636) notes that the form of the cithara, a 
rhythmic instrument “having to do with strings and striking,” was “originally like 
that of the human chest.” The strings also have an allegorical valence: “The ancients 
called the cithara fidicula and fidicen, because the strings are in good accord with each 
other, as befits men among whom there is trust (fides).” Moreover the word for 
strings, chordae, come from the word for heart (cor), “because the striking of the 
strings of the cithara is like the beating of the heart in the breast.”  William Oliver 
Strunk, Source Readings in Music History (New York: Norton, 1965), 153. Isidore 
of Seville, Etymologiae 22.1-6, Patrologiae cursus completus: series latina, ed. J. P. 
Migne, vol. 82 (Paris, 1844), col. 167A-C: “Tertia est divisio rhythmica pertinens ad 
nervos et pulsum, cui dantur species cithararum diversarum….Forma citharae initio 
similis fuisse traditur pectori humano….Veteres autem citharam fidiculam vel fidem 
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The focus on how sound is formed in the hollow of the ea-
gle’s neck by forces stirring below is strikingly anatomic (on an ea-
gle that is so two-dimensional that he only has one eye), in a sense 
deflating the nobility of this majestic talking bird. The comparison 
with instruments makes the sound clearly involuntary on the part 
of the eagle, willed by others who direct the sound, like the guitarist 
on the strings or the trumpet-player on the wind-holes. The enor-
mous eagle, sign of imperial authority, is a mere vessel, a hollow 
object, a musical instrument, as opposed to a living thing with its 
own voice. This odd attention to the production of sound in the 
eagle’s neck in fact resembles nothing so much as the terrible image 
of the brazen bull back in Inferno 27— which was an ingenious 
instrument of torture and a symbol of tyranny.  
 
Come ’l bue cicilian che mugghiò prima 
col pianto di colui, e ciò fu dritto, 
che l’avea temperato con sua lima, 
mugghiava con la voce de l’afflitto, 
sì che, con tutto che fosse di rame, 
pur el pareva dal dolor trafitto; 
così, per non aver via né forame 
dal principio nel foco, in suo linguaggio 
si convertïan le parole grame. (Inf. 27.7-15) 
 
As the Sicilian bull that first lowed with the cries of him who (and that 
was just) had smoothed it with his file, it lowed with the voice of the 
one suffering inside it so that, though it was made all of bronze, it still 
seemed pierced by pain; in the same way, having no other path or 
opening from their origin in the fire, the wretched words were trans-
formed into its language. 
 
As I have written elsewhere, this metal bull, in which a living man 
could be roasted over a slow fire, transforms the natural expression 
of raw human pain into what seems the inarticulate voice of animal, 
but is instead an artificial instrument. 44 In the eagle, sound becomes 
voice. In the bull, voice becomes sound. Or rather, in the bull, 
human voice becomes sound resembling animal voice.   
I think that this resemblance of the talking eagle of the 
heaven of justice to the horrible device employed by the tyrant, 
Phalaris, is deliberate, rather than accidental, so that we are made 
 
nominaverunt, quia tam concinunt inter se chordae ejus, quam bene conveniunt inter 
quos fides sit….Chordas autem dictas a corde, quia sicut pulsus est cordis in pectore, 
ita pulsus chordae in cithara.” See discussion in Ciabattoni, Dante’s Journey to Po-
lyphony, 190. 
44 Alison Cornish, “Music, Justice and Violence in Paradiso 20” Dante Studies 134 
(2016): 112-141. 
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to think about what distinguishes just government from tyranny—
since from the perspective of power they might look like the same 
thing.  Both involve instruments and voices. Both are artificial but 
employ the individual voices of real humans.  In the one case a 
single human is made, through force, to scream—thus causing the 
ingenious instrument to produce a sound that resembles the voice 
of an animal. In the other, the various songs (canti) of individual 
human beings are both natural, like the sound of water splashing 
on rocks, and artificial like the sound of flutes (flailli) or chimes 
(squilli), and when they join together by means of the instrument 
of the eagle they themselves form together, the sound they produce 
is transformed into a voice, not the voice of an animal or even of a 
man, but of a collectivity in which the sound “I” means “we.” It is 
not the silent logos of the law, but the unison voice of the polity.   
The eagle is a musical instrument to be played by an entire 
political corpus. It is not the image of a “just and merciful prince,”45 
nor Hobbes’ leviathan, the ultimate sovereign ruler, but rather a 
hollow shell, a tool needing to be used, an instrument needing 
breath (the breath of “holy thoughts”) or tactile percussion in order 
to make a sound, tell its tale, or pronounce its judgment. In medi-
eval political thought, even monarchists take it for granted that le-
gitimate authority has its source in the people. Society has no ex-
istence independent from the individual human beings that make 
it up.46 The political point of this image is not that it is headed by 
one ruler (although certainly that remained Dante’s idea of best 
government) but that it is universal: that the many who compose it 
function as a single organism. They have their own voices, but, 
taken together, on occasion, or over time, they can produce a clear 
and unified message, indeed, a song.47 
 
45 As Massimo Verdicchio suggests in The Poetics of the Paradiso (Toronto, 2010), 
111. 
46 Jean Dunbabin, “Government” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political 
Thought c.350–c.1450, ed. J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 515: “All medieval authors took it for granted that legitimate authority was 
grounded in the people.” Anthony Black, “The individual and society,” in the same 
volume, 588-606, 601: “In the later Middle Ages an academic consensus that social 
entities have no reality apart from the individual human beings that compose them.” 
(Emphasis in original.) 
47 This ideal musical view of the polity contrasts significantly with Jacques Attali’s 
notion of music as the “channelization” of the violence that is noise, “and therefore 
a simulacrum of sacrifice and ritual murder.” See Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political 
Economy of Music (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 26-28; Adam 
M. Koehler, A Sound Form of Knowledge: Composition and the Rhetorical Problem 
of Music (2008 Madison Wisc. English Ph.D. dissertation); and the recent reassess-
ment by Eric Drott, “Rereading Jacques Attali’s Bruits,” Critical Inquiry 41, no. 4 
(2015): 721-756. 
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Is “song” the equivalent of “voice”? Calvino, quoted by 
Cavarero, calls attention to the “voice as voice, as often happens in 
the case of a song” and associates singing with the feminine, think-
ing (presumably silent) with the masculine. 48 The great medievalist 
and scholar of orality, Paul Zumthor, was keenly interested in voice 
especially with regard to the primary product of the Occitan trou-
badours: canso. In Stephen Nichols’ paraphrase, “Zumthor con-
strues voice not simply in a utilitarian sense, as an instrument for 
public communication, but as part of the body’s ‘signature’ or im-
print on poetry through performance.”  Zumthor wrote that: 
 
When the poet or his interpreter sang or recited […]voice alone con-
ferred authority on the text.  But when the poet gave an oral recitation 
from a book, the authority came rather from the book. 49 
 
In his treatise on the vernacular language, Dante proposed 
models for the best kind of vernacular in poetry (particular poems 
by Dante) and particularly in those long compositions called songs 
or canzoni. Cantio, he says, is an act of singing, just as lectio is an 
act of reading. Active singing is something created by an author (as 
Virgil uses the word in the first line of the Aeneid, “I sing of arms 
and the man.” Passive singing refers to the occasions on which this 
creation is performed, either by the author or by someone else, 
whoever it may be, either with musical accompaniment or with-
out. A canzone is an action of the person who composes it; not the 
person who performs it. And proof of this, Dante says, is that we 
never say, “that’s Peter’s song” when referring to something Peter 
has performed, but only to something he has made.”50 Thus when 
Casella sings one of Dante’s canzoni on the shore of Purgatory 
(“Amor che ne la mente mi ragiona”), it is not Casella’s song, but 
Dante’s.51  In the “passive” sense of the word cantio, however, it is 
 
48 Cavarero, 8: “questa ‘voce in quanto voce, come si offre nel canto’”; and 12: “Fem-
minilizzati per principio, l’aspetto vocalico della parola e, tanto più, il canto com-
paiono come elementi antagonisti di una sfera razionale maschile che si incentra, in-
vece, sull’elemento semantico. Per dirla con una formula: la donna canta, l’uomo 
pensa.” See Pettman’s discussion, “The Acousmatic Voice,” 148-149. 
49 Stephen Nichols, “Augustine and the Troubadour Lyric,” 138. Paul Zumthor, To-
ward a Medieval Poetics (University of Minnesota, 1991), 35. See also Emma Dillon 
‘Sensing sound,’ in A Feast for the Senses: Art and Experience in Medieval Europe, 
ed. Martina Bagnoli (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 96-114. 
50 Dante, De vulgari eloquentia 2.8.4 (Milan: Garzanti, 1991), 80: “Signum autem 
huius est quod nunquam dicimus, “Hec est cantio Petri” eo quod ipsam proferat, sed 
eo quod fabricaverit illam.” 
51 Purg. 2.76-117. Still, when the the sweetness that lasts, that still “sounds within” 
seems to be the sweetness of that particular performance, of Casella’s beautiful voice, 
not simply of the song written by Dante. Martin Eisner made this point, that it is not 
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the performer that is acted upon by the song.52 The singer of some-
one else’s song becomes an instrument of that song that uses that 
particular singer as a vehicle for getting sung, for sounding out.53   
 In this regard, it is interesting to note a remark the late an-
tique Roman senator and educator Cassiodorus makes about the 
psalms. 
 
Whoever recites the words of a psalm seems to be repeating his own 
words, to be singing in solitude words composed by himself; it does 
not seem to be another speaking or explaining what he takes up and 
reads.  It is as though he were speaking from his own person, such is 
the nature of the words he utters.54 
 
Every psalm, that is, becomes Peter’s song. 
Or Dhuoda’s song. In the handbook she wrote for her son 
William, the ninth-century matron Dhuoda connected the famous 
incipit of Wisdom (Diligite iustitiam “Love justice you who rule 
the earth”) with the theme of justice that runs through the Psalms:   
 
‘Love justice,’ so that you will be known as a just man.[…] For the 
‘just Lord has loved justice’ [Ps. 10.8] and loves it always. […] You 
therefore, son William, beware and flee iniquity, love righteousness, 
 
“Casella’s song” in his presentation entitled, “Dante’s Song: Reconsidering the Sig-
nificance of ‘Amor che ne la mente mi ragiona’ in Purgatorio II, at the conference 
on Dante and Music at the University of Pennsylvania, in November 5-6, 2015. See 
also Albert Ascoli, “Performing Salvation in Dante’s Commedia” Dante Studies 135 
(2017): 74-106; and Thomas Peterson, “From Casella to Cacciaguida,” Bibliotheca 
Dantesca: Annual Journal of Research Studies 1 (2018), Article 12. 
52 Dante, DVE 2.8.4, 78-80: “Circa hoc considerandum est quod cantio dupliciter 
accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod fabricatur ab auctore suo, et sic est actio -- 
et secundum istum modum Virgilius primo Eneidorum dicit “Arma virumque cano” 
--; alio modo secundum quod fabricata profertur vel ab autore vel ab alio quicunque 
sit, sive cum soni modulatione proferatur, sive non: et sic est passio. Nam tunc agitur, 
modo vero agere videtur in alium et sic tunc alicuius actio, modo quoque passio 
alicuius videtur. Et quia prius agitur ipsa quam agat, magis, immo prorsus denominari 
videtur ab eo quod agitur, et est actio alicuius, quam ab eo quod agit in alios. Signum 
autem huius est quod nunquam dicimus, “Hec est cantio Petri” eo quod ipsam profe-
rat, sed eo quod fabricaverit illam.” 
53  But even the maker of the canzone—at least a good one—has to be acted upon by 
other songs, by rules of composition and by the words themselves. Dante’s advice to 
would-be poets is to “make the practice of such constructions habitual, to read the 
poets who respect the rules, namely Virgil, the Ovid of the Metamorphoses, Statius, 
and Lucan, etc. Dante, DVE 2.6.7, 74: “Et fortassis utilissimum foret ad illam habitu-
andam regulatos vidisse poetas, Virgilium videlicet, Ovidium Metamorfoseos, Statium 
atque Lucanum.” 
54 Cassiodorus, Explanation of the Psalms, trans. P. G. Walsh, vol. 1 (Mahwah, New 
Jersey: Paulist Press, 1990), 41. 
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practice justice.  Dread hearing the Psalmist’s words: ‘Who loves in-
justice hates his own soul.’ [Psalm 10.6]55   
 
In her letter, William would have heard the voice of his mother, 
who in turn reminds him of what is written and what, whether he 
wants to or not, he will be bound to hear—with dread—if he does 
not follow Biblical precepts, the Psalmist’s words, which have now 
become hers, and ought to become his. 
In these remarks I have been thinking about sound as it re-
lates to voice and what both suggest about the human person and 
the configuration of human persons we call a community, or a po-
lis.  In the voice of the eagle played, like a musical instrument, by 
all the individual voices that constitute it, there is the possibility of 
a voice of justice that speaks not for all but by means of all the 
individuals who make up a polity, and for Dante the only polity 
that really mattered was the polity of the whole human race. It is 
the love of justice, or of musical justesse, that turns the noisy cata-
ract of abundant multitude into the controlled musical voice of 
well-tempered justice, to which we are called to attune ourselves.  
In our present-day world, where most of our communica-
tion does not happen by means of live voice, theorists from Paul 
Zumthor to Adriana Cavarero have been trying to get us to re-
member what Roland Barthes termed, “the grain of the voice,” 
which Barthes defined as “the materiality of the body speaking its 
mother tongue.” Dominic Pettman, in a wonderfully titled article, 
“Pavlov’s Podcast: The Acousmatic Voice in the Age of MP3s,” 
concludes: 
 
As our existence is increasingly experienced within digitized networks, 
the challenge is not only to rescue the grain of the voice but also to be 
attuned to the voice of the grain, to listen attentively to the environ-
ment, an environment that includes both paradises and parking lots.56  
 
55 Dhuoda, Handbook for Her Warrior Son: Liber Manualis, ed. Marie Anne Mayeski 
(Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 155: “Diligite iustitiam, ut 
iustus esse videaris in causis. Nam iustus Dominus iustitias dilexit [Ps. 10.8] diligitque 
semper: aequitatem videt vultus eius [Ps.10.8]. Valde eam, eo tunc in tempore, dili-
gebat et diligi admonebat ille qui dicebat: Diligite iustitiam, qui iudicatis terram. [Sap. 
1.1] Et item alius: Si iustitiam loquimini, recte iudicate. [Ps.57.2] Scriptum namque 
est: In quo enim iudicio iudicaveritis, et. cetera. [Matthew 7.2] Tu ergo, fili Wil-
helme, cave et fuge iniquitatem, ama aequitatem, sectare iustitiam, time audire 
Psalmographi dictum: Qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam. [Psalm 10.6].” 
56 Roland Barthes, “The Grain of the Voice” in Image/Music/Text, trans. Stephen 






Bibliotheca Dantesca: Journal of Dante Studies, Vol. 2 [2019], Art. 1
https://repository.upenn.edu/bibdant/vol2/iss1/1
Bibliotheca Dantesca, 2 (2019): 1-25 
 
 
~ 25 ~ 
 
 




Cornish: "SONUS QUI NON EST VOX"
Published by ScholarlyCommons, 2019
